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438 I Tokugawa Loyalism: Boshin War 
contriving to increase tensions by accusing 
Hideyori of planning rebellion, Ieyasu led 
an army to Osaka in 1614 and laid siege to 
its castle. Early in 1615, Ieyasu offered a 
peace in return for the destruction of the cas-
tle's outer defenses. When that was done , 
Ieyasu resumed his attack and took the cas-
tle. Hideyori and his family committed 
suicide. 
Ieyasu, through war, adept alliances, 
skilled administration, and outright treach-
ery, had completed the unification of Japan 
begun by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi and 
ended its long era of political chaos. By 
carefully planning for his succession, he 
ensured that the Tokugawa shogunate 
would survive his death. After the destruc-
tion of Osaka, Ieyasu returned to Sumpu, 
became ill, and died on June 1, 1616. 
Ryan Reed 
See also: Oda Nobunaga; Sakoku; Sankin 
kotai (Alternate Attendance); Sekigahara, 
Battle of; Toyotomi Hideyoshi. 
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Tokugawa Loyalism: Boshin War 
The number of supporters of the Tokugawa 
shogunate dwindled after its second punitive 
mission against the Choshil domain failed in 
1866. Few vassal daimyo (fudai) answered 
the shogunate's call to arms, and among 
those who did, their large armies fought 
without enthusiasm. Some fought only 
because they happened to be near Choshil, 
such as the Kokura domain, which was 
invaded by Choshil samurai. In 1867, the 
last shogun, Yoshinobu, led a coalition 
army to Kyoto to "free" the emperor from 
the grasp of enemy influences, but was 
stopped in the villages of Toba-Fushimi, 
where the shogunate lost again, despite out-
numbering its opposition. Preempting those 
who desired to eliminate him as an enemy 
of the court, Yoshinobu returned his title of 
shogun to the emperor, resigning from his 
position as head of the shogunate. 
Following the loss at Toba-Fushimi, many 
vassal daimyo hedged their bets and declared 
loyalty to the court. Most of them did not par-
ticipate in the fighting, some refused to resist 
the court, and others claimed that because the 
shogun had resigned, there was nothing left 
to defend. From the winter of 1868 to the 
summer of the following year, a mixed 
group of daimyo, samurai, and commoners 
fought against the advancing Satsuma- and 
Choshii-Ied armies, many, but not all, in the 
name of Tokugawa loyalism. In general, re-
sistance occurred in three interconnected 
regions: Edo and the surrounding country-
side, the domains of the Northeast, and a 
final battle in the north at Hakodate. 
The most fervent Tokugawa loyalists could 
be found among the Tokugawa liege vassal 
samurai, whose fate was tied to the shOgun-
ate. Oguri Tadamasa, who had served the 
shogunate as a finance commissioner and for-
eign affairs magistrate, was the most vocal 
among those who wanted to fight against 
Satsuma and Choshil. After his view failed 
to convince the shogun to fight, the shogun 
fired him. He retired to his fief and was later 
executed, the only shogunate vassal to suffer 
this fate. Other colleagues formed units of 
low-ranking samurai and commoners, like 
their emperor-zealot counterparts, the shishi, 
to maintain stability in Edo. The largest of 
these, the Sh6gitai, eventually received 
authority to protect Yoshinobu. The group 
quickly amassed 3,000 to 4,000 members 
who engaged in guerrilla warfare against the 
invading army. They were finally defeated 
by government troops during the battle of 
Ueno in the summer of 1868. 
Many loyalists fled to the northwest, 
where they joined 26 domains to fight 
against the Meiji government's troops, in 
what is called the Boshin War. Although 
some were vassal daimyo of the Tokugawa 
family, little evidence suggests that they 
fought out of a sense of loyalty to the Toku-
gawa family. In fact, they imitated the 
imperial loyalist domains by propping up 
their own imperial family member, Prince 
Rinnoji, and created a royalty-centered 
government like the new Meiji one. Even 
so, much of the fighting occurred in the 
Aizu domain, one of the three daimyo fami-
lies closely related to the Tokugawa. The 
Aizu-led coalition lost in the fall of 1868. 
Former shogunate samurai and survivors 
of the fighting in Aizu led a final rebellion 
against the emperor's armies under the lead-
ership of Enomoto Takeaki, head of the shO-
gunate's navy. Rather than turn over the 
shogunate's eight warships, as negotiator 
Katsu Kaishii had promised, Enomoto sailed 
them from Edo to the north in the summer of 
1868. Disaffected samurai, daimyo, and 
even a few French military advisers who 
worked for the shogunate joined him in 
Hakodate, Hokkaido. Enomoto attempted 
to establish a rival government, the republic 
of Ezo. This group held the first elections 
on the Japanese islands, but failed to con-
vince a Tokugawa family member to come 
lead their newly formed nation. Thousands 
of troops clashed with the government's 
army, losing to them in the summer of 
1869. Enomoto was later pardoned and 
became Minister of the Navy. 
The Boshin War and Tokugawa loyalism 
was short-lived, having been destroyed by 
Tokugawa Nariaki I 439 
the fall of 1869. Many former Tokugawa 
samurai, like Enomoto and Katsu Kaishu, 
found employment with the Meiji govern-
ment, especially in vital fields such as 
foreign affairs, finance, and the navy. The 
bloodiest fighting in Aizu scarred local his-
tory there, much as warfare affected the 
American South after the Civil War. Even 
in Aizu today, when people there refer to 
"the war," it signifies not World War II, but 
the Boshin War. 
Michael Wert 
See also: Aizu Samurai Spirit; Boshin Civil 
War; Hitotsubashi Keiki (Tokugawa Yoshi-
nobu); Katsu Kaishi.i; Meiji Ishin Shishi; Mito 
School; Tokugawa Bakumatsu Military 
Reforms. 
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T okugawa Nariaki (I 800-1860) 
Born in Mito-han in 1800, Tokugawa Nar-
iaki studied with the Mito scholars Aizawa 
Seishisai and Fujita Toko, both of whom 
were key advisers. His political outlook 
